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Abstract
The economic theory attributes search costs as the cause for price disper-
sion. Search costs are much lower in electronic markets than in conventional
markets, yet various empirical studies have revealed that persistent price dis-
persion characterizes online markets. We examine a model of price dispersion,
in which buyers face non-negative search costs in a known price distribution,
while a distribution of search costs is known to sellers. We show that un-
der certain conditions variance of the price distribution can actually increase
even though search costs decrease. In addition, the market could display more
extreme prices when a decrease of search costs affects the buyers disparately.
1 Introduction
Cost of information is one of the key determinants of an efficiently functioning mar-
ket. A considerable amount of information is involved in production, negotiations,
decisions and market transactions. Consumers and firms incur costs from gathering,
processing and transmitting information. Since these costs are rarely equal to every
market incumbent, information is often asymmetric in markets. As a consequence,
asymmetric and costly information favors the market structures of imperfect com-
petition.
The rise of electronic commerce spurred hopes that more competitive markets would
emerge on the Internet. Electronic business processes lower various information costs,
such as search costs. In this respect, electronic markets should be more efficient
than the conventional markets. Neo-classical economic theory juxtaposes efficiency
with competition. Competitive e-markets were even expected to gravitate towards
marginal cost pricing. However, empirical research on e-markets has revealed that
the opposite is true. Wide and persistent price dispersion seems to characterize even
the online markets for homogenous products such as CDs, DVDs and books. For ex-
ample, Bailey (1998), Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000) and Ancarani & Shankar (2004)
have discovered significant price dispersion in the online retail markets. Moreover,
a time span of these studies implicates that the condition is permanent.
Search costs have been under the loop since B2C-markets took off on the Inter-
net. A widely accepted view is that superior search mechanisms on the Internet,
such as shopbots, and the ease of accessing online market information will reduce
search costs dramatically. The economic theory attributes search costs as a major
reason for a distribution of prices commonly found in various markets (Stigler 1961,
p. 214). Several theoretical models, such as Varian (1980) and Carlson & McAfee
(1983), suggest that a dispersed price equilibrium is a consequence from heteroge-
neous consumer search costs. Since they are significantly lower in the e-markets,
price dispersion seems to indicate that either electronic markets are not as efficient
as was presumed, or lower information costs do not spawn a neo-classical competi-
tive market that is ruled by the law of one price.
A few studies have offered insights to lay out reasons behind the persistence of
price dispersion. According to Baye & Morgan (2001), an explanation could be that
information flows on the Internet are regulated by the owners of search services.
These ”information gatekeepers” find it optimal to induce price dispersion to max-
imize their profits. Smith (2001) considers differences in consumers’ awareness of
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sellers and their abilities to search to be the cause for dispersed prices. Dinlersoz
& Yorukoglu (2004) argue that it could result from increased information in the
market because many e-tailers have spent heavily on advertising to gain visibility in
the market.
In this paper, we offer another explanation for dispersed prices in the e-markets.
Our analysis shows that variance of a price distribution can actually increase even
though consumer search costs decrease. We also offer an explanation why price
dispersion could become permanent despite the inherently competitive business en-
vironment of e-markets.
2 Change in Search Costs and Price Dispersion
2.1 Search Costs and Variance in Known Distribution
Assume that there is a monopolistically competitive market for a homogeneous prod-
uct. The market is populated by a large number of buyers and a finite number of sell-
ers1. The sellers are profit-maximizing firms and the buyers are utility-maximizing
consumers who look for the lowest price in the market. The interaction between the
buyers and sellers can be considered a game in which the players move simultane-
ously. Before a more detailed descripition of the model, let us briefly examine the
game between the buyers and sellers.
As in most real world situations, the buyers and sellers are not identical. Each
firm has a different marginal cost of production. Each buyer incurs subjective costs
from searching which are known to her, and these costs vary across buyer popula-
tion. For example, consumers with high incomes are likely to have high opportunity
costs for time. This can be considered as high search costs and thus, they avoid
searching, have higher effective reservation prices and accept higher offers (Banks &
Moorthy 1999, p. 376). The distribution of search costs among the buyer population
is common knowledge to the sellers. While the distribution of prices is known to the
buyers, they are not aware of the exact location of each seller. Hence, the buyers
use a search rule, which will be defined later, to find acceptable prices. Since the
sellers know this, they will set their prices accordingly, which creates a distribution
of prices that is known to the buyers.
1To avoid repetition in text, we use interchangeably the terms ’consumer’, ’customer’ or the
pronoun ’she’ for ’buyer’ and and ’firm’ for ’seller’.
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The characterization of the buyers and sellers is based on the model of a discrete
equilibrium price dispersion by Carlson & McAfee (1983). We present it here only
from those parts that are convenient to our analysis.
There are n profit-maximizing firms in the market. They differ from each other
in their marginal costs of production. A cost function for a representative firm j is
cj(qj) = ajqj + bq
2
j , (1)
where aj > 0, b > 0, aj ≤ aj+1 and j = 1, 2, ..., n − 1. In consequence, the most
efficient seller in the market, which is the one with the lowest marginal cost, is able
to set the lowest price.
The buyers are assumed to know the distribution of prices in the market and the
value of their subjective search costs, but they are not aware of the exact distribution
of the sellers. To simplify the model, they expect the distribution to be of a uniform
density. This is the same as to say that the consumers expect to find any price pi
with the same probability f(pi) =
1
n
. Consumer search costs sj are non-negative
and exogenously defined in correspondence to an expected gain xj from finding a
price lower than the price pj, which is an effective reservation price for a buyer with
search costs sj. The expected gain from finding a price lower than pj is
xj =
j−1∑
i=1
(pj − pi)f(pi), j = 2, ... , n. (2)
This equation can also be expressed as
xj =
[
j−1∑
i=1
(pj − pi) 1
j − 1
]
j − 1
n
, (3)
which states that the expected gain from searching is the difference between pj and
an average of j−1 lower prices times the probability of discovering one of these prices.
Two problems, which have to be accounted for, arise from costly search. First, the
Diamond Paradox predicts that with positive search costs, every seller charges a
monopoly price at the equilibrium (Anderson & de Palma 2005, pp.63-64). Second,
Stiglitz (1979) points out that if the first quote is costly and every seller sets the
monopoly price, the customers whose reservation prices are close to or below the
monopoly price will not enter the market. To avoid these ramifications, we assume
that there are some consumers with search costs s1 equal to zero. These buyers
search across the entire distribution of prices until they find the lowest price. Since
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setting the monopoly price would mean that the firms with low marginal costs of
production would share the customers equally with other sellers, they have an incen-
tive to undercut their rivals’ prices and increase their profit. In addition, we assume
that the first quote is free whereas further search is costly. As a result, the monopoly
price equilibrium cannot prevail.
Given the subjective search cost sj, the buyer’s sequential search rule from the
known distribution is:
if xj > sj , continue the search
if xj ≤ sj , terminate the search.
This means that she compares the expected gain from searching to her search costs.
As a result, she searches until a price that is equal or lower than her effective reser-
vation price turns up.
A buyer will buy at or below a price pj if xj ≤ sj < xj+1. The buyer is indifferent
between searching for a lower price and buying at the price pj when xj = sj. For ex-
ample, a buyer with search cost of sj−1 has found the price pn−2 where n−2 > j−1.
Since xn−2 > sj−1, there is an incentive to continue the search. She will finish the
search as soon as any price p ≤ pj−2 has been found. On the other hand, if the buyer
finds a price lower than her effective reservation price at the first trial, there is no
incentive to search further because the expected gain from the search is less than
her cost from searching.
Applying the search rule to equation (3) and rearranging, the effective reservation
price the buyer is willing to pay becomes
pj =
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 (4)
At the other end of the spectrum, the buyers whose search costs exceed sn accept
the first offer they receive. A partial derivative
∂pj
∂sj
≥ 0 (with strict inequality when
sj > 0) verifies that an increase in search costs also increases the effective reservation
price.
The effective reservation price pj for the buyer with search costs sj consists of two
components. These are the search component n
j−1sj and the product value compo-
nent
∑j−1
i=1
pi
j−1 . An interpretation for this is that all buyers include an amount of
search in their respective reservation prices pj. If the first quote received is more
than pj then the acceptable price after searching is less than pj. In the absence of
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search costs, the reservation price would be equal to an average of j−1 lower prices.
As was stated earlier, the sellers know the distribution of search costs among the
buyer population. Consumer search costs constitute a demand system for the sell-
ers. Let a continuous function G(s) represent the number of buyers with search cost
less or equal to x, which denotes an expected gain from finding a lower price. At
G(0) = 0, and at G(∞) is equal to the total number of buyers. A seller with the
highest price can expect to share the buyers who do not search equally with all
other sellers. In consequence, the expected demand qn when every seller has equal
probability to be sampled is
qn =
1
n
[G(∞)−G(sn)] . (5)
The next seller receives qn and the demand from the buyers with search costs at or
below sn−1. The demand facing the seller with price pj can be written recursively
qj = qj+1 +
1
j
[G(sj+1)−G(sj)] . (6)
As a consequence, increasing the price decreases demand and decreasing the price
has an opposite effect.
Since the market is monopolistically competitive, assume that the demand facing
the firm j depends on the difference between the average market price and the firm
j’s price. The lower the price, the more customers a firm is able to lure in. Define
T > 0 as the range of the search costs. A density for the distribution of search
costs from G(s) is denoted by k with 0 < k < T . A demand function for the firm j
becomes
qj =
1
kn
[T − (pj − p¯)] , (7)
where p¯ =
∑n
i=1
pi
n
is the average market price.
Effects of price changes on search behavior can be examined by comparative static
analysis. Keeping search costs constant, a partial derivative
∂xj
∂pj
= 1
n
> 0 indicates
that increasing (decreasing) the effective reservation price increases (decreases) the
expected gain from searching and encourages (discourages) searching. Changes in
prices lower than pj reverse the effect.
∂xj
∂pj
= − 1
n
< 0 shows that a rise (a decline)
in the lower prices decrease (increase) the expected gain from searching. Notice,
however, that
∂xj
∂pj+1
= 0 shows that changes in the prices above pj do not have any
significance for the buyer. The demand facing the firms that sell to the customers
with search costs above sj is independent on the demand at or below this cost, be-
cause the probability that the lower cost types would buy at price pj+1 is zero.
6
The firms set profit-maximizing prices by exploiting consumer search costs. This
produces a price distribution in the market, which is in an ascending order with an
equal probability for each pi
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pn. (8)
Calculating the profit-maximizing level of production for the firm j is a mechanical
task, which is of no interest here.
Next, we proceed to examining the impact of a change in search costs on the vari-
ance of a price distribution2. The formula to calculate the variance in our price
distribution is
var(p) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(pj − p¯)2. (9)
Substituting from (4), we can verify that for any price pj, the variance is
var(p) =
[
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 −
n∑
i=1
pi
n
]2
. (10)
In other words, the variance in effective reservation prices can be expressed with
search costs and the product value.
By examining this formula more carefully, we are able to observe how changes in
search costs impact the variance of prices. Before embarking on this, we make an
assumption that a reservation price pj that is equal to the mean p¯ exists. Denote this
reservation price by pm. This is an important boundary condition because if pj = p¯,
then var(p) = 0. The prices that exceed pm are higher reservation prices, and the
prices below pm are lower reservation prices. As a result, we can use equations (9)
and (10) to write out the formula for variance explicitly:
var(p) =
1
n
(p1 − p¯)2 + m−1∑
j=2
(
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 − p¯
)2
(11)
+
(
n
m− 1sm +
m−1∑
i=1
pi
m− 1 − p¯
)2
+
n∑
j=m+1
(
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 − p¯
)2 .
It is now straightforward to see, how reductions in search costs for any buyer type
change the variance. There are two conditions that lead to a decrease in the variance.
2See Appendix for a more detailed treatment.
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A reduction in search costs which is focused solely on the buyers with the reservation
prices above the market average decreases the variance of prices. Another condition
emerges when proportional values of the search components are greater with the
higher reservation prices. This happens when
n
j−1
pj
sj ≤
n
j−1+1
pj+1
sj+1, j = 2, . . . , n− 1. (12)
The real world examples of this could be a lack of expertise at using search tech-
nology, inadequate knowledge of the market or flaws in a market-mechanism design
(Chiang et al. 2005, pp. 11-13). As a result, a universal reduction in search costs,
which is proportionally equal to every buyer, tends to have a larger effect on the
buyers with the higher reservation prices. This decreases the variance of prices.
There are some conditions in e-markets which lead to an increase in the variance of
prices. As before, the reduction affecting only the buyers below the market average
increases the variance. A rational assumption is that those buyers, which have the
low reservation prices, are able to get better informed on the market conditions.
They could, for instance, be more adept at searching, afford better equipment, or
have lower opportunity costs for time. Consequently, they could be more willing to
learn to use new search technologies and reap the most benefits from them. The
values of their search components, therefore, are lower than for the buyers which
have the high reservation prices (Baye et al. 2003, p. 18). It is also possible that
the search components could become proportionally greater in value with the lower
reservation prices. This takes place when large differences between the lower prices
exist. In this case, a reduction in search costs has a larger effect on the buyers with
the lower reservation prices. However, a universal proportional reduction leads to a
decrease in the variance.
Recent studies on consumer search behavior in the online B2C-markets have re-
vealed evidence that disparately reduced search costs could create price dispersion.
For example, a study by Johnson (et al. 2004) indicated that lower search costs do
not necessarily lead to more intense search activity in online markets. The number
of consumer searches in the purchases of books was on average merely 1.1. Similarly,
with purchases of travel services, which are usually of higher value than books, the
number of searches was only 1.8. The amount of search, however, was noticed to
increase over time. This could implicate that consumers learn to take advantage of
the available search technology which leads to a gradual decrease in search costs.
Smith (2001) argues that some segments of the consumer market can adapt to a
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new search technology faster than others and benefit from the lower search costs.
He found that computer books have a lower price dispersion and lower prices than
other types of books. As an explanation for this, Smith suggests that the consumers
buying the computer books are more sophisticated at using better search mecha-
nisms, such as shopbots, than an average consumer. Baye (et al. 2003) notes that
the consumers who use the shopbots pay on average 16% less for their purchases in
the online markets.
2.2 Market Dynamics
Search procedures that utilize marginal calculations are practical in predicting mar-
ket dynamics. According to Rothschild (1974), if all buyers are assumed to follow a
similar rule, the firms in the market face demand that is a non-increasing function
of price. The higher (the lower) the price, the less (the more) customers a firm at-
tracts. In a market that is characterized by monopolistically competitive firms with
free entry and constant returns to scale heterogeneous production technology, an
increase in consumer search activity means that there is a downward pressure on
pricing. Low-priced sellers have large sales volumes while high-priced sellers settle
for a lesser transaction volume (Stigler 1961, p. 217).
Since the impact of the reduced search costs is likely to affect the buyers asym-
metrically, a firm that loses customers has to adjust to the situation. If it cannot
compete with lower prices, the firm may exit from the market. Generally, monopo-
listically competitive firms are not expected to make supernormal profits in the long
run. For this reason, the price set by the firm j must be equal to its average cost
ACj =
cj(qj)
qj
. By substitution from equations (1) and (7), we obtain
ACj = aj +
b
kn
[
T − n
j − 1sj −
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 + p¯
]
(13)
A comparative static result from the partial derivative
∂ACj
∂sj
< 0 shows that a de-
crease in search costs leads to an increase in average costs. All things equal, the firm
with an eroding customer base has to raise prices to maintain profitability. More
efficient firms, on the other hand, receive more customers. For this reason, they can
increase their output and lower their prices further. On the whole, this could mean
that the market displays more extreme prices, which increases the variance of a price
distribution.
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In the long run, it is likely that the distribution of prices shifts towards a ”U-
shaped” distribution where the probability mass is concentrated in more extreme
prices (Varian 1980, p. 656). Consequently, as the higher-priced firms receive more
customers, they are able to increase output and lower prices, whereas the lower
priced firms will have to raise their prices as a response to a decline in demand.
Ultimately, this could induce cyclical price fluctuations as the firms adapt to chang-
ing demand conditions. As a consequence, price dispersion becomes a permanent
phenomenon on the e-markets.
3 Conclusion
Various empirical studies have revealed that price dispersion is a permanent con-
dition in electronic markets. According to the economic theory, the markets where
information costs are low should be characterized by marginal cost pricing of free
competition or at least a lesser degree of price dispersion. However, several studies
have shown that e-markets display persistent price dispersion.
Heterogeneous consumer search costs could explain the existence of price disper-
sion in e-markets. Our analysis shows that reductions in search costs can either
decrease or increase the variance of a price distribution. A universal reduction in
search costs or a reduction that has a bias on the buyers with higher search costs
decreases the variance. The variance can increase, if the reduction is affecting only
the buyers who have lower search costs. Therefore, price dispersion cannot be auto-
matically interpreted as evidence of non-competitive pricing. On the contrary, this
could be evidence of decreasing search costs among the buyers who already face
lower search costs in e-markets.
Disparate search costs may have impacts on market dynamics. They can make the
prices in a market more extreme because the less efficient firms have to adjust to
a shift in demand by increasing their prices. Therefore, price dispersion persists or
even increases, if only a small fraction of the buyers is able to use the new search
technology to reduce their search costs.
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Appendix
A formula to calculating the variance for variables yi, where i = 1, . . . , n is by a
definition
var(y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2, (A.1)
where
y¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (A.2)
is the mean calculated from n observations.
For n prices, the variance of a price distribution is
var(p) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(pj − p¯)2. (A.3)
Writing out the formula explicitly for all pj, where j = 1, . . . , n, we get that
var(p) =
1
n
[
(p1 − p¯)2 + (p2 − p¯)2 + . . .+ (pn − p¯)2
]
. (A.4)
Using the average price pm = p¯ as a boundary that divides the 1, . . . , n reservation
prices into lower and higher reservation prices, the equation becomes
var(p) =
1
n
[
(p1 − p¯)2 + (p2 − p¯)2 + . . . (pm − p¯)2 + . . .+ (pn − p¯)2
]
. (A.5)
For any single effective reservation price pj, the variance can be calculated by sub-
stituting pj with the expression from the equation (4), which yields
var(p) =
(
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 −
n∑
i=1
pi
n
)2
. (A.6)
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Substituting this into equation (A.5) and using sum operators, the variance can be
written as
var(p) =
1
n
(p1 − p¯)2 + n∑
j=2
j 6=m
(
n
j − 1sj +
j−1∑
i=1
pi
j − 1 − p¯
)2
+
(
n
m− 1sm +
m−1∑
i=1
pi
m− 1 − p¯
)2 . (A.7)
Notice that p1 cannot be expressed with search costs because of equation (2).
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